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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20020455-CA 
v. : 
KEVIN WRIGHT KILLIAN, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2001), in the Eighth Judicial 
District Court, in and for Duchesne County, State of Utah, the Honorable John R. Anderson, 
presiding. This court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did defendant receive ineffective assistance from his trial counsel who declined 
to importunately malign police officers or assert an untenable statutory defense? A claim of 
ineffective assistance raised for the first time on appeal is reviewed for correctness. State v 
Maestas, 2000 Utah App 22, f 11,997 P.2d 314 (citing State v. Simmons, 866 P.2d 614, 618 
(Utah App 1993)) 
STATUTES AND RULES 
The following determinative statutes and rules are attached at Addendum A: 
Amendment VI, United States Constitution; 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2001); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-701 (1998); 
Rules 23B and 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Kevin Wright Killian, was charged with driving under the influence of 
alcohol ("DUI"), in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (R. 32-33). The information 
additionally charged that defendant had been convicted of four previous violations of section 
41-6-44(6)(a), which enhanced the DUI charge to a third degree felony (R. 32-33). The trial 
court appointed counsel for defendant (R. 12). 
Defendant moved to suppress evidence on the ground that his arrest was a police 
"setup" in which officers allowed him to drive knowing that he was intoxicated (R. 27). The 
trial court denied the motion (R. 39). 
A jury found defendant guilty as charged (R. 95, 97). The trial court sentenced 
defendant to a statutory zero-to-five-year term, but suspended the sentence and placed him 
on supervised probation for three years, specifically directing that defendant serve 180 days 
in jail and not consume or possess alcohol during his probation (R. 114-16). Defendant 
timely appealed (R. 119, 123). * Defendant's trial counsel withdrew and his appellate 
counsel entered her appearance (R. 143, 162). 
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 One week after he was sentenced, defendant consumed alcohol in violation of his 
probation (R. 125-30). The trial court sentenced defendant to one year in jail and 
continued his probation for thirty-six months (R. 138, 159). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
On September 1, 2001, Roosevelt City Police Officer Ammon Manning, a six-year 
law enforcement veteran, was eating lunch at Pinn Willies with Utah Highway Patrol 
Trooper Stradinger, and off-duty Deputy Tucker. Pinn Willies is a gas and convenience store 
on Highway 87 between Altamont and Duchesne (R. 165:71-72, 74). Defendant entered the 
store, and, after using the restroom, picked up a twelve pack of Budweiser and purchased it 
from the clerk (R. 165:72-73, 81-83, 93). Officer Manning became concerned when he 
smelled alcohol coming from the general area defendant had occupied (R. 165:72-73,78-79). 
Officer Manning also noticed defendant's eyes were "glassy," a symptom of "someone under 
the influence" (R. 165:80). Officer Manning shared his concern with Trooper Stradinger that 
defendant might have "been drinking" and be intoxicated and asked his fellow officer to see 
if defendant was about to drive (R. 165:73, 94). Trooper Stradinger exited the store to talk 
with the defendant, but found defendant had already gotten into his truck and driven away 
(R. 165:73,94,124). Because his patrol car was blocked by Officer Manning's car, Trooper 
Stradinger 's pursuit was delayed until Officer Manning moved his car (R. 165:73, 94-95). 
When Trooper Stradinger pulled out of the store lot and onto Highway 87, defendant 
was already out of sight (R. 165:73, 95, 124-25). Proceeding in defendant's direction, 
Trooper Stradinger, followed by Officer Manning, located defendant driving about two miles 
away on an intersecting dirt road (R. 165:73, 95-96, 125-26). When Officer Stradinger 
2
 The facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are recited in a light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, \2, 25 P.3d 985. 
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caught up with defendant, he activated his red and blue emergency lights to initiate a traffic 
stop (R. 165:96). Defendant continued to drive another two-tenths of a mile until he reached 
a residence, where he stopped. All the while Trooper Stradinger's lights continued flashing 
(R. 165:96, 132-33). Defendant exited his truck and Trooper Stradinger met him between 
the two vehicles (R. 165:97). Trooper Stradinger detected alcohol coming from the 
defendant as he approached him (R. 165:98). The officer explained to defendant that he 
stopped him because Officer Manning had "detected the odor of alcohol about his person" 
(R. 165:97). Defendant acknowledged that he had "partied pretty hard" the night before (R. 
165:119). 
After explaining the reason for the traffic stop, Trooper Stradinger conducted field 
sobriety tests to determine whether defendant was impaired by alcohol (R. 165:98). Those 
tests were "the standardized national recognized tests which are the horizontal gaze 
nystagmus test which have to do with the eyes, and the one leg stand, and the nine-step walk 
and turn" (R. 165:98). On the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, defendant received "all six" 
points out of a "possible negative score of six" (R. 165:98-100). Defendant was unable to 
satisfactorily complete the one leg stand test, raising his arms contrary to instructions and 
failing to extend his leg for the full thirty seconds or to count correctly, missing numbers 
"11" and "17" and counting "22" twice (R. 165:101). Defendant performed the nine-step 
walk adequately, but his ability to follow instructions, as with the other tests, was "poor" (R. 
165:102). Officer Manning, who had followed Trooper Stradinger, video-taped the one-leg 
stand and nine step walk, which was played to the jury (R. 165:74-75, 106-07). Based on 
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the smell of alcohol coming from the defendant and his performance on the field sobriety 
tests, Trooper Stradinger concluded that defendant had "too much alcohol in his system to 
safely operate a motor vehicle" and was therefore "in violation of Utah State Code 41-6-44 
for driving under the influence of alcohol" (R. 165:103-04). Trooper Stradinger placed the 
defendant under arrest and transported him to the Duchesne County Jail (R. 165:104, 107). 
While in jail, defendant voluntarily submitted to a breathalyser test (R. 165:107-09, 
154). Trooper Stradinger, certified to operate the jail's "Intoxilyser 5000," administered the 
test (R. 165:109-10). Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Scott Halfcock, a breath alcohol 
technician responsible for maintaining the Intoxilyser 5000, testified that that machine was 
working properly on September 1, 2001 (R. 165:157-160). The results of the breathalyser 
showed defendant's alcohol blood level was .169, more than twice the legal limit of .08 (R. 
165:107, 113,162; State's Exhibit 4). After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant admitted 
drinking half a bottle of vodka and a 12-pack of beer between 9:30 p.m. the night before and 
6:00 a.m. that day (R. 165:114-16). 
Defendant, following consultation with his counsel, chose not to put on a defense (R. 
165:170). The jury found the defendant guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol (R. 
165:190-191). The prosecution then presented evidence of defendant's convictions for 
driving under the influence of alcohol in 1993, 1994, 1997, and 1998 (R. 165:192-201; 
State's Exhibits 10, 11, 13, and 14). The jury found defendant guilty of two or more prior 
convictions of driving under the influence of alcohol within the past ten years, which 
enhanced the current conviction to a third degree felony (R. 165:203-204). 
5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defense counsel was not ineffective in choosing not to argue at trial that the police 
"set up" defendant for a DUI arrest by allowing him to leave Pinn Willies knowing that he 
was intoxicated, or in choosing not to request an instruction on public intoxication. The 
record shows that counsel made a reasonable and conscious decision to abandon at trial any 
attempt to seriously malign the character of testifying officers. Additionally, there was no 
rational basis to support instructing the jury on public intoxication, where the evidence was 
overwhelming that defendant was guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol. This 
Court may even decline to consider the merits of defendant's claim because defendant has 
not only failed to bring up or further develop a record demonstrating his counsel's deficient 




DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT HIS COUNSEL 
RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Defendant claims that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by abandoning 
at trial the theory espoused in his motion to suppress evidence, that the police "set up" 
defendant for a DUI arrest by allowing him to leave Pinn Willies even though they knew he 
was intoxicated. Defendant argues they should have instead arrested him for public 
intoxication. Aplt. Br. at 7-11. The claim is meritless. 
"To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, [a defendant] must show 
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that (1) trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient and (2) there exists a reasonable 
probability that absent the deficient conduct, the outcome would likely have been more 
favorable to [defendant]." State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, f 21, 9 P.3d 777 (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 693 (1984)). To prove deficient 
performance, "appellant must demonstrate that counsel's actions were not conscious trial 
strategy, and that there was a lack of any conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." 
State v. Windward, 941 P.2d 627, 633 (Utah App. 1997) (citations and internal quotations 
omitted). "[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but 
must be a demonstrable reality." State v. Coonce., 2001 UT App 355, H 18, 36 P.3d 533 
(quoting Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)). 
Contrary to defendant's claim, defense counsel appears not to have abandoned, but 
rather argued, substantially the same theory at trial as she is alleged to have argued at the 
suppression hearing. At the suppression hearing, counsel moved to suppress evidence on the 
ground that defendant's arrest was a "setup" because the officers let him to drive knowing 
that he was intoxicated (R. 27). As set out below, defense counsel at trial very ably and 
doggedly again developed the theory that the police essentially acted in bad faith and might 
have "setup" defendant. 
Cross-examining Officer Manning, counsel tried to elicit from him that he knew 
defendant to be a drinker (R. 165:79). Officer Manning initially replied that in the five and 
one-half years he had been a police officer in Duchesne County, he had never heard from 
other officers that defendant drank and that he viewed defendant as he would any other 
7 
citizen (R. 165: 79-80). Counsel then sought to discredit Officer Manning by pointing out 
that he had mentioned that defendant also had "glassy" eyes for the first time on cross-
examination did he observe (R. 165:80-81). Counsel also elicited from Officer Manning, 
through sustained questioning, that he apparently remembered defendant's movements in the 
store much more distinctly than he did any of the other customers' or his fellow officers' 
even before the officer smelled alcohol on defendant (R. 165:83-90). Counsel tried to 
suggest that Officer Manning knew defendant was driving toward a residence known for 
drug and alcohol problems (R. 165:86-87). When counsel directly asked what made Officer 
Manning notice defendant particularly, Officer Manning acknowledged that he was familiar 
with defendant (R. 165:87-88). Counsel then returned to the officer's initial denial about his 
ignorance of defendant's alcoholism and elicited a retraction, in which Officer Manning 
acknowledged that he was "familiar in a vague way with the idea that [defendant] might be 
associated with drugs and alcohol" (R. 165:88-89). 
Counsel also explored whether Trooper Stradinger knew defendant to be an habitual 
drinker, but was only able to elicit that the trooper was relatively new to the area and had no 
special knowledge of defendant (R. 165:121-23). 
Moreover, contrary to defendant's assertions on appeal, see Aplt. Br. at 8-10, trial 
counsel presented in closing a rational defense of which police bias was the most prominent 
component. The theory of the defense was that defendant was not intoxicated (R. 165:187). 
In support, counsel argued that defendant did not respond to Trooper Stradinger's emergency 
lights because the road was too narrow to safely pull over, that instructions for the field 
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sobriety tests were hastily given and that evaluation of the test is "very subjective," that 
defendant's demeanor clearly indicated that he did not believe himself to be intoxicated, and 
that the breathalyser test was fully compromised by defendant's not having eaten for many 
hours (R. 165:184-87). 
The initial and most fully developed part of defendant's defense, however, was that 
Officer Manning simply decided defendant had been drinking because the officer knew 
defendant had past problems with alcohol. Referencing the testimony she had elicited during 
Officer Manning's cross-examination, counsel argued the following points: (1) only Officer 
Manning, alone among his fellow officers with specialized training and who were positioned 
closer to defendant, detected the odor of alcohol on defendant, (2) for no special reason the 
officer especially remembered defendant as opposed to other customers, (3) Officer 
Manning, contrary to his initial testimony, really knew that defendant drank, and (4) 
defendant's movements in the store belied the officer's impression that defendant was 
intoxicated (R. 165:182-84). In sum, defense counsel at trial plainly sought to discredit the 
police, based on evidence of a biased attitude toward defendant, as she apparently intended 
in moving to suppress evidence. 
Even if this Court found that defendant's argument at trial was significantly 
different than that defendant claims was presented at the suppression hearing but was 
abandoned at trial, see Aplt. Br. at 8-10, defendant's claim would fail. First, "proof of 
ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable 
reality." State v. Coonce., 2001 UT App 355,^118,36 P.3d 533 (quoting Fernandez v. Cook, 
9 
870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993)). "[Wjhere, on direct appeal, defendant raises a claim that 
trial counsel was ineffective (and assuming defendant is represented by different counsel than 
at trial), defendant bears the burden of assuring the record is adequate." State v. Litherland, 
2000 UT 76, f 16, 12 P.3d 92 (clarifying that if "defendant is aware of any 'nonspeculative 
allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could support 
a determination that counsel was ineffective,'... defendant bears the primary obligation and 
burden of moving for a temporary remand [under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure]").3 Cf. State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, f 23, 9 P.3d 777 (finding record 
sufficient to evaluate trial counsel's tactics based on record developed following rule 23B 
hearing). "Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies 
resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of finding that counsel performed 
effectively." hither land, 2000 UT 76, at \ 16. 
In this case, defendant has failed to bring up the transcript of the suppression hearing 
or develop additional evidence concerning counsel's strategy under rule 23B. Defendant can 
only speculate about why counsel at trial might have deviated from her strategy at the 
suppression hearing. It is therefore impossible for this Court to intelligibly conclude that 
counsel did not reasonably abandon any argument allegedly made in support of the motion 
to suppress. 
Additionally, even if this Court found that defendant's one-page suppression motion 
(R. 27) adequately announced a distinctly more forceful attack on the police than was 
3
 Defendant was represented by Karen Allen at trial and is represented by Julie 
George on appeal (R. 12, 143). 
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presented at trial, defendant's claim would fail. To prove deficient performance, ''appellant 
must demonstrate that counsel's actions were not conscious trial strategy, and that there was 
a lack of any conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. Windward, 941 P.2d 
627, 633 (Utah App. 1997) (citations and internal quotations omitted). In so doing, the 
defendant must overcome "a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the 
wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 689(1984). 
Defendant has not presented any credible argument that counsel could not have 
reasonably consciously abandoned a virulent and inflammatory attack on police integrity 
at trial that purportedly had already been presented to a trial judge at the suppression 
hearing and failed (R. 39). In fact, the evidence at trial indicates that such an attack at trial 
would likely have backfired because the evidence showed that the police did not allow 
defendant to leave Pinn Willies knowing that he was intoxicated. Rather, they were unable 
to accost him before he left and only reasonably suspected that he was intoxicated (R. 165: 
72-73, 78-80, 94, 124). Thus, contrary to defendant's claim, counsel appears to have made 
a very reasonable decision to abandon a factually unsupported defense of police malfeasance, 
based on the trial court's denying the motion to suppress. 
In any event, defendant's claim that counsel was deficient in failing to request a public 
intoxication instruction, either as a theory of defense or as a lesser included offense 
instruction, see Aplt. Br. at 9-10, fails. Again, defendant has not developed any record 
evidence that trial counsel did not consciously and reasonably choose to not request a public 
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intoxication instruction. Therefore, counsel's actions should be construed as effective 
performance. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, at ][17. Also, as noted above, the theory of the 
defense at trial was that defendant was not intoxicated. See State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 52, 
If 39, 467 Utah Adv. Rep. 25(counsel not required to request a lesser included offense 
instruction that is inconsistent with the defense). Therefore, counsel might reasonably have 
believed that a public intoxication instruction would offer the jury an unwarranted avenue 
for conviction. 
More importantly, defense counsel does not perform deficiently in not requesting an 
instruction to which defendant is not entitled. See State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, ^  34, 989 
P.2d 52 (noting trial counsel's decision to forgo futile acts does not amount to ineffective 
assistance). The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
One of the foundational principles in regard to the submission of issues 
to juries is that where the parties so request they are entitled to have 
instructions given upon their theory of the case; and this includes on lesser 
offenses if any reasonable view of the evidence would support such a verdict. 
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 154 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted) (emphasis partially in 
original) (quoting State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 372, 374, 463 P.2d 811,812 (1970)). The 
public intoxication statute provides: "A person is guilty of intoxication if he is under the 
influence of alcohol, a controlled substance, or any substance having the property of 
releasing toxic vapors, to a degree that the person may endanger himself or another, in a 
public place or in a private place where he unreasonably disturbs other persons." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-9-701 (1) (1998) (emphasis added). Because there is no evidence 
whatsoever that defendant disturbed other persons in Pinn Willies, defendant was not entitled 
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to a public intoxication instruction. Consequently, defense counsel was not ineffective in 
failing to request that instruction. 
Finally, this Court may decline to consider defendant's entire claim of ineffective 
assistance because defendant has failed to make any serious argument that he was prejudiced 
as a result of his counsel's alleged deficient performance.4 Defendant's entire argument on 
prejudice consists of two sentences: 
Finally, [defendant] argues that but for the failure on the behalf of trial counsel 
the result in his jury trial would have been different. Mr. Killian is sure that 
he would have been found guilty of public intoxication and the jury would 
have seen through the set up by the police officer had defense counsel been 
more vigilant. 
Aplt. Br. at 10. Defendant having renounced the burden of analysis and argument, this Court 
should decline to consider his claim. 
In any event, it is plain that defendant was not prejudiced by any failure of trial 
counsel to defend him by maligning the police officers. "To establish the prejudice prong 
[of ineffective assistance of counsel], the defendant must show ca reasonable probability 
exists that except for ineffective counsel, the result would have been different.'" State v. 
Munson, 972 P.2d 418, 422 (Utah 1998) (quoting State v. Lovell 758 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 
1988)). "'"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
4
 See rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure ("The argument shall 
contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, 
including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."); State v. Thomas, 
961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (refusing to consider inadequately briefed claim under 
rule 24(a)(9), and stating "that this court is not "'a depository in which the appealing 
party may dump the burden of argument and research'") (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)) (original citation omitted). 
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the outcome/"" State v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 283, 293 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State \\ 
Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 719 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)), affd 
2000 UT 10,994 P.2d 1243. In determining whether an error was harmful, a court considers 
a number of factors, including "the overall strength of the State's case." State v. Hamilton, 
827 P.2d 232,240 (Utah 1992); State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004,1011 (Utah App. 1994). "The 
more evidence supporting the verdict, the less likely there was harmful error." Hamilton, 827 
P.2d at 240. 
In accord with the statute in effect at the time of the offense, September 2001, the jury 
was correctly instructed that defendant could be found guilty of driving under the influence 
of alcohol if he was operating a vehicle and (1) had "sufficient alcohol in his body that a 
chemical test given within two hours of the alleged operation or physical control show that 
he had a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater;" or (2) "was under 
the influence of alcohol... to a degree which rendered [him] incapable of safely operating 
a vehicle" (Jury Instruction #8, R. 86).5 
The evidence is overwhelming that both statutory alternatives were proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Defendant stated on the DUI admonition form that he had been driving 
to a friend's house on Highway 87 at 1:45 p.m. (R. 165:114-15). The breathalyser test was 
administered to defendant at 2:55 p.m. (R. 165:108-09). Troopers Stradinger and Halfcock, 
both certified to operate the properly functioning breathalyzer, testified that the results of the 
5
 Drivine under the influence of alcohol is provided for by Utah Code Ann. § 41-
6-44 (2)(a). Subsequent to defendant's committing the offense, subsection (2)(a) was 
amended to eliminate the requirement that defendant's blood or breath alcohol content be 
measured within two hours of the vehicle's operation. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 
2002) amendment notes. 
14 
breathalyser showed defendant's alcohol reading was 169, more than twice the legal limit 
of 08 (R. 165:107, 113, 157-60,162; State's Exhibit 4). Also, based on the smell of alcohol 
coming from the defendant and his performance on the field sobnety tests, Trooper 
Stradinger concluded that defendant had "too much alcohol in his system to safely operate 
a motor vehicle" (R. 165:103-04). On the other hand, there was no evidence that the officers 
maliciously set defendant up for an arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol. 
In sum, because there was overwhelming evidence that defendant, without police 
instigation, was guilty of the charged offense, defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's 
defense strategy. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j± day of March, 2003 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
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[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
ARTICLE 5 
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS 
DRIVING 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or 
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concen-
tration — Measurement of blood or breath alco-
hol — Criminal punishment — Arrest without 
warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revoca-
tion of license. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a 
substance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance 
Abuse in accordance with Section 62A-8-107; 
(b) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol-related reck-
less driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or 
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United 
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States 
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol-related 
reckless driving if committed in this state, including punishments 
administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; 
(c) "screening and assessment" means a substance abuse addiction and 
dependency screening and assessment obtained at a substance abuse 
program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse in accordance 
with Section 62A-8-107; 
(d) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death; 
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a sub-
stance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse 
m accordance with Section 62A-8-107; 
(f) "substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed sub-
stance abuse program; 
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordi-
nance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
and 
(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to 
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent 
person exercises under like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle 
within this state if the person: 
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(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a chemical test given 
within two hours of the alleged operation or physical control shows 
that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 
grams or greater; or 
'ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined 
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
<b> The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has 
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath 
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
'3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsec-
tion (2) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate 
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the 
time of the offense; or 
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 
years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense. 
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third 
degree felony if the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon 
another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent 
manner. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first 
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecu-
tive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 
24 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, 
or home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the 
court does not order substance abuse treatment as described under 
Subsection (4)(d); and 
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment 
if the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance 
abuse treatment is appropriate. 
(e) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii), the court may order 
probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the person had a blood 
alcohol level of .16 or higher, the court shall order probation for the 
person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a 
prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence 
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
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(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, 
require the person to 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 
240 hours; or 
(a) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic 
monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13) 
f c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, 
or home confinement, the court shall. 
(0 order the person to participate in a screening and assessment, 
(u) order the person to participate in an educational senes if the 
court does not order substance abuse treatment as described under 
Subsection (5)(d), and 
(in) impose a fine of not less than $800 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment 
if the substance abuse treatment program determines that substance 
abuse treatment is appropriate. 
(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with 
Subsection (14). 
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony 
if it is committed: 
(i) within ten years of two or more prior convictions under this 
section; or 
(n) at any time after a conviction of: 
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is com-
mitted after July 1, 2001; or 
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after 
July 1, 2001. 
(b) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution 
of a prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall 
impose: 
d) a fine of not less than $1,500; and 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours 
(c) For Subsection (6)(a) or (b), the court shall impose an order requiring 
the person to obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse 
treatment at a substance abuse treatment program providing intensive 
care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-
through after treatment for not less than 240 hours. 
(d) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(b), the 
court may require the person to participate in home confinement through 
the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may 
not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or 
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served 
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this 
section may not be terminated. 
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a 
sentencing court to order a convicted person to* participate in a 
screening and assessment; and an educational series; obtain, in the 
discretion of the court, substance abuse treatment, obtain, mandato-
rily, substance abuse treatment, or do a combination of those things, 
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-44 6 or 41-6-45 
under Subsection (9). 
(a) The court shall render the same order regarding screening and 
assessment, an educational series, or substance abuse treatment in 
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connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under 
Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would 
render in connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or 
subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
(b) If a person fails to complete all court ordered screening and 
assessment, educational series, and substance abuse treatment, or fails to 
pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and treatment costs, 
the court shall notify the Driver License Division of a failure to comply. 
Upon receiving the notification, the division shall suspend the person's 
driving privilege in accordance with Subsections 53-3-221(2) and i3). 
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a 
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under 
Section 41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a 
substitute for, an original charge of a violation of this section, the 
prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea, 
including whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol, 
drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with 
the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows 
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of 
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea 
offered under this Subsection (9Xb) of the consequences of a violation of 
Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45. 
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction 
of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9). 
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation 
of this section when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has 
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to 
believe that the violation was committed by the person. 
(11) (a) The Driver License Division shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted 
for the first time under Subsection (2); 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any 
subsequent offense under Subsection (2) if the violation is committed 
within a period of ten years from the date of the prior violation; and 
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the 
court under Subsection (12). 
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or 
revocation period the number of days for which a license was previously 
suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension 
was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is 
based. 
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court 
may order the operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation 
of Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 
days, 180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the highways those 
persons who have shown they are safety hazards. 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this 
Subsection (12Xb), the court shall prepare and send to the Driver License 
Division an order to suspend or revoke that person's driving privileges for 
a specified period of time. 
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement 
through the use of electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall 
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alert the appropriate corrections, probation monitoring agency, law en-
forcemeat units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts. 
(b» The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions 
which require: 
11) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
id) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of 
the person, so that the person's compliance with the court's order may 
be monitored; and 
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring. 
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection 
(13)(e) to place an electronic monitoring device on the person and install 
electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of the person or other 
specified location. 
id) The court may: 
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to in-
clude a substance abuse testing instrument; 
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during 
the time the person is subject to home confinement; 
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person 
to attend school educational classes, or employment and to travel 
directly between those activities and the person's home; and 
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement 
if the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be 
administered directly by the appropriate corrections agency, probation 
monitoring agency, or by contract with a private provider. 
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers 
by the court under Subsection (13)(c)(iv). 
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 41-6-44.6 or 
Subsection (4)(e) or (5)(e): 
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation; 
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation; and 
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation. 
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by 
contract with a probation monitoring agency or a private probation 
provider. 
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor 
the person's compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence, 
conditions of probation, and court orders received under this article and 
shall notify the court of any failure to comply with or complete that 
sentence or those conditions or orders. 
(d) (i) The court may waive all or part of the costs associated with 
probation if the person is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall 
cover the costs of waivers by the court under Subsection (14)ld)(i). 
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is 
admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher, 
then if the court does not order: 
(a) treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d), (5)(d>, or i6)ib)(iii), 
then the court shall enter the reasons on the record; and 
(b) the following penalties, the court shall enter the reasons on the 
record: 
(I) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of 
probation for the person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or 
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of elec-
tronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, * 34; C. 1943, 
57-7-111; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1957, ch. 75, 
§ l ;1967,ch.8M 2; 1969, ch. 107, § 2; 1977, 
ch. 268, § 3; 1979, ch. 243, § 1; 1981, ch. 63, 
* 2;1982,ch.46,§ 1; 1983, ch. 99, § 13; 1983, 
ch. 103, § 1; 1983, ch. 183, § 33; 1985, ch. 46, 
§ 1; 1986, ch. 122, § 1; 1986, ch. 178, § 29; 
1987, ch. 138, § 37; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, § 2; 
1988, ch. 17, $ 1; 1990, ch. 183, § 16; 1990, 
ch. 299, § 1; 1991, ch. 147, § 1; 1993, ch. 168, 
§ 1; 1993, ch. 193, § 1; 1993, ch. 234, § 32; 
1994, ch. 159, § 1; 1994, ch. 263, § 1; 1996, 
ch. 71, § 1; 1996, ch. 220, § 1; 1996, ch. 223, 
§ 2; 1997, ch. 68, § 1; 1998, ch. 13, § 46; 1998, 
ch. 94, § 1; 1998, ch. 168, § 1; 1999, ch. 33, 
§ 1; 1999, ch. 226, § 1; 1999, ch. 258, § 1; 
2000, ch. 333, § 1; 2000, ch. 334, § 1; 2001, 
ch. 64, § 1; 2001, ch. 289, * 1; 2001, ch. 309, 
§ 1; 2001, ch. 355, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amend-
ment by ch. 226, effective May 3, 1999, deleted 
Subsection (6XaXi), making class A misdemean-
ors an alternative classification; deleted Sub-
sections (6XaXiiXA) and (B), relating to three 
and two prior convictions, respectively; deleted 
former Subsection (6Kb), relating to fines, jail 
sentences, and alternatives to jail sentences; 
inserted "or 53-3-231" in Subsection (llXb); and 
made designation and stylistic changes. 
The 1999 amendment by ch. 258, effective 
May 3,1999, rewrote Subsection (2XaXi), which 
read "has a blood or breath alcohol concentra-
tion of .08 grams or greater as shown by a 
chemical test given within two hours after the 
alleged operation or physical control," and 
made stylistic changes. 
The 1999 amendment by ch. 33, effective July 
1, 1999, added Subsections (4)(bXii) and 
(5XbXii), making related changes; inserted "or 
home confinement" in Subsections (4Xc) and 
(5Xc); added Subsections (6Xd) (Subsection 
(6Xc) in the reconciled version) and (13); and 
made related changes throughout the section. 
The 2000 amendment by ch 333, effects 
May 1, 2000, substituted "a substance abuse 
testing instrument" for "an alcohol detection 
breathalyzer" m Subsection <l3Hd)in ar\<i 
added Subsection (14) (Subsection '15* in the 
reconciled version). 
The 2000 amendment by ch. 334. effects 
May 1, 2000, rewrote the section, adding 
providions for educational series, substance 
abuse screenings and assessments, substance 
abuse treatment programs, and supervised pro-
bation and added Subsection r14) 
The 2001 amendment by ch. 64, effective 
April 30, 2001, in Subsection (6)(a), added the 
(i) designation, deleted "third or subsequent" 
before "conviction," substituted "Violation of 
Subsection (2)" for 'Violation," added Subsec-
tion (6)(aXii), and made stylistic changes. 
The 2001 amendment by ch. 289, effective 
April 30, 2001, made the same changes as ch. 
64 and also substituted uten years" for "six 
years" in Subsections (5Xa), (6XaKi), and 
(llXaXii). 
The 2001 amendment by ch. 355, effective 
April 30, 2001, in Subsection (4)(e), added "(i) 
Except as provided in Subsection (4)(eXiif and 
added Subsection (4XeXii) and in Subsection 
(HXa) added the reference to Section 41-6-44 6. 
The 2001 amendment by ch. 309, effective 
July 1, 2001, added Subsection (3XaXiiXC) and 
inserted aor two years" in Subsection (12)(a). 
This section has been reconciled by the Office 
of Legislative Research and General Counsel. 
Coordination clause. — The amendment 
by Laws 1999, ch. 33 included changes in Sub-
section (6Xb) similar to the changes made by 
that act in Subsections (4Xb) and (5)(b), but ch. 
33, § 3 directs that the passage of ch. 226 causes 
the amendments to Subsection (6Kb) in ch. 33 
to be deleted from the act. 
Croat-References. — Sentencing for felo-
nies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
76-9-701. Intoxication — Release of arrested person or 
placement in detoxification center. 
(1) A person is guilty of intoxication if he is under the influence of alcohol, a 
controlled substance, or any substance having the property of releasing toxic 
vapors, to a degree that the person may endanger himself or another, in a 
public place or in a private place where he unreasonably disturbs other 
persons. 
(2) A peace officer or a magistrate may release from custody an individual 
arrested under this section if he believes imprisonment is unnecessary for the 
protection of the individual or another; or a peace officer may take the arrested 
person to a detoxification center or other special facility as an alternative to 
incarceration or release from custody. 
(3) When a person who is at least 13 years old, but younger than 18 years 
old, is found by the court to have violated this section, the provisions regarding 
suspension of the driver's license under Section 78-3a-506 apply to the 
violation. 
(4) When the court has issued an order suspending a person's driving 
privileges for a violation of this section, the person's driver license shall be 
suspended under Section 53-3-219. 
(5) An offense under this section is a class C misdemeanor. 
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Rule 23B. Motion to remand for findings necessary to 
determination of ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
(a) Grounds for motion; time. A party to an appeal in a criminal case may 
move the court to remand the case to the trial court for entry of findings of fact, 
necessary for the appellate courts determination of a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. The motion shall be available only upon a nonspeculative 
allegation of facts, not fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true. 
could support a determination that counsel was ineffective. 
The motion shall be filed prior to the filing of the appellants brief. Upon a 
showing of good cause, the court may permit a motion to be filed after the filing 
of the appellant's brief. In no event shall the court permit a motion to be filed 
after oral argument. Nothing in this rule shall prohibit the court from 
remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim 
has been raised and the motion would have been available to a party. 
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall 
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be 
accompanied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on 
appeal that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The 
affidavits shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the 
appellant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. The motion shall 
also be accompanied by a proposed order or remand that identifies the 
ineffectiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such 
claim to be addressed on remand. 
A response shall be filed within 20 days after the motion is filed. The 
response shall include a proposed order of remand that identifies the ineffec-
tiveness claims and specifies the factual issues relevant to each such claim to 
be addressed by the trial court in the event remand is granted, unless the 
responding party accepts that proposed by the moving party. Any reply shall be 
filed within 10 days after the response is filed. 
(c) Order of the court. If the requirements of parts (a> and (b) of this rule 
have been met, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to 
the trial court for the purpose of entry of findings of fact relevant to a claim ot 
ineffective assistance of counsel. The order of remand shall identify the 
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ineffectiveness claims and specify the factual issues relevant to each such 
claim to be addressed by the trial court. The order shall also direct the trial 
court to complete the proceedings on remand within 90 days of issuance of the 
order of remand, absent a finding by the trial court of good cause for a delay of 
reasonable length. 
If it appears to the appellate court that the appellants attorney of record on 
the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the court shall direct that 
counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appellant be appointed or 
retained. 
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be 
vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other procedural 
steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, 
unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties 
or upon the court's motion. 
(e) Proceedings before the trial court. Upon remand the trial court shall 
promptly conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the 
findings of fact necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Any claims of ineffectiveness not identified in the order of remand 
shall not be considered by the trial court on remand, unless the trial court 
determines that the interests of justice or judicial efficiency require consider-
ation of issues not specifically identified in the order of remand. Evidentiary 
hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable after 
remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the fact. 
The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial court 
shall enter written findings of fact concerning the claimed deficient perfor-
mance by counsel and the claimed prejudice suffered by appellant as a result, 
in accordance with the order of remand. Proceedings on remand shall be 
completed within 90 days of entry of the order of remand, unless the trial court 
finds good cause for a delay of reasonable length. 
(f) Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all 
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court 
reporter shall immediately prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings 
as required by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the 
trial court has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial 
court shall immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings 
upon preparation of the supplemental record. If the record of the original 
proceedings before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate 
court, the clerk of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental 
proceedings upon the preparation of the entire record. 
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the trial 
court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule for 
briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been made 
during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are 
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals. 
The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the 
same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals. 
(Added effective October 1, 1992; amended effective April 1, 1998.) 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(1> A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of 
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set 
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to 
the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: 
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in 
the trial court. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the app>eal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph 111 > 
of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e> of this 
rule. 
(8> Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made 
in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under 
which the argument i& arranged. 
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(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of 
the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a 
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding. 
(10» A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary 
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless 
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound 
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum 
shall contain a copy of: 
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central 
importance cited in the brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals 
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but 
not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the courts 
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not 
include: 
( D a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied 
with the statement of the appellant; or 
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum 
of the appellant. The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in 
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further 
briefs may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs 
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual 
names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the injured 
person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages 
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any 
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or 
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each 
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by 
the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If 
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was 
identified, offered, and received or rejected. 
(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall 
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph <a> of this rule. In cases invoking cross-appeals, paragraph <g> of 
this rule set* forth the length ot bnefs 
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(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeal* If a cross-appeal is filed, the party 
first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of 
this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise 
orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The brief 
of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments in-
volved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant 
and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a bnef 
which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-
appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues raised in the 
appellants opening bnef. The appellants second bnef shall not exceed 25 
pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not 
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellants 
answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first 
brief The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table 
of authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the 
court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown 
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any 
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another 
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations An original 
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original letter 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing 
and shall be similarly limited. 
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise. 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free 
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which 
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte 
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending 
lawyer. 
(k) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and 
shall comply with Rule 27. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1. 1995; April 1, 1998 
November 1, 1999.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 24 
(a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts 
have long held. See In re Beesley, 883 P2d 1343, 
1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v Newmeyer, 745 
P2d 1276 1278 (Utah 1987). T o successfully 
appeal a trial court's findings of fact, appellate 
counsel must play the devil's advocate ' must 
extricate from the client's shoes and fully as-
^ume the adversary's position In order to prop-
erly discharge the duty , the challenger must 
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, 
every >crap of competent evidence introduced 
at trial which supports the very findings the 
appellant resists "ONEIDAISLIC, i OXEIDA 
Cold Storage and Warn house lm , 872 P2d 
1051. 1052-53 (Utah App 1994> (alteration in 
original) (quoting West Valley City L Majestic 
Inv Co , 818 P2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App 1991 
See also State ex rel MS. i Salata. 806 P2a 
1216, 1218 (Utah App 199V. Bell i Elder 7*2 
P2d 545. 547 (Utah App 1989), State i Moore 
802 P2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App 19901 
The brief must contain for each is>ue rais^ 
on appeal, a statement of the applicable -tan 
dard of review and citation ot >upportm£ u 
thonty 
Amendment Notes. - The 1998 amend 
ment added the second sentence in Subdm^ 
<e) concerning published deposition* or trJ 
scripts
 1 
The 1999 amendment added the last ^ 
tence in Subdivision <a»<9> 
